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
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)

Routing Slip

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SUSPENSE DATE:

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Remarks:

D/ Executive Secretary

17 Aug 78

Date

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The Speaker's Rooms
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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August 7, 1978

Honorable Stansfield Turner
The Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Admiral:

Thank you for your letter of July 21 detailing the procedures you have implemented within the CIA for the control of Legislative Branch access to compartmented intelligence information.

As you know, the President recently expressed strong concern to the leadership of the Congress over the numbers of Congressional employees with such access. I agree with him that the greater the numbers of individuals with such access, the larger the risk of unauthorized disclosure of sensitive intelligence information. I have pledged my support to the President in limiting access to sensitive intelligence information wherever possible and in whatever other steps which the House can take to safeguard such information. One such step -- the creation of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence -- has already occurred. I believe you will agree that arrangements for access with this Committee have worked well. Information in the hands of the Committee Members and its staff has been properly safeguarded while the Committee has exercised its various budget, legislative and oversight activities.

I should add that the arrangement for access to compartmented intelligence information reached by you and the Committee is a worthy model. In it the Legislative Branch's authority to grant access to such information after consulting the DCI is clearly defined. I feel that delineation to be an important one and I am pleased that your memorandum of understanding with the Committee confirms it.

Honorable Stansfield Turner
August 7, 1978
Page Two

In closing, I would like to respond to your specific request concerning staff access to sensitive information by designating the following Leadership staff members as necessary assistants to the Leadership in foreign policy and intelligence matters:

Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.

✓ Gary G. Hymel, Administrative Assistant
✓ L. Kirk O'Donnell, General Counsel

Democratic Steering and Policy Committee
Irvine H. Sprague, Executive Director

Majority Leader James C. Wright, Jr.

✓ Craig Raupe, Executive Assistant
✓ Marshall L. Lynam, Administrative Assistant

Majority Whip John Brademas
James P. Mooney, Assistant

Deputy Majority Whip Dan Rostenkowski
James C. Healey, Administrative Assistant

Sincerely,



Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
The Speaker

O/bgl

cc: Honorable Edward P. Boland, Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

78-18211

Clearances

OLC 78-1944/b

21 JUL 1978

Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill
Speaker of the House
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In view of my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods, I became greatly concerned by the proliferation of highly sensitive intelligence collected and maintained within systems of compartmentation. I initiated a review within the Executive Branch to reassess the justification for existing clearances and to limit issuing future clearances based on the strictest application of need-to-know.

This same concern extends to the Legislative Branch. As you know, staff personnel of our Congressional oversight committees have been granted access to highly sensitive compartmented intelligence information. However, due to the broadening of interest in foreign intelligence within the Congress, access has been extended to staffs of other committees. It is imperative a review, similar to that underway within the Executive Branch, be undertaken within the Legislative Branch to assure that current and future access to highly sensitive intelligence information is clearly justifiable.

Accordingly, I have designated my Legislative Counsel to serve as the point to review all requests for such access for Congressional personnel. His office will contact the chairmen and staff directors of those committees concerned to assess the justification of existing clearances and to establish agreed upon guidelines to assess critically need-to-know for future clearances. I do not intend in any way to degrade or impair the work of any committee which requires access to sensitive intelligence. It is my concern, however, that the need-to-know has not been clearly warranted. In this regard, experience has shown that most congressional requirements for substantive intelligence can be satisfied without access to highly sensitive sources and methods information.

Where there is a clearly justifiable need, Members of Congress are given access to sensitive intelligence information. Personal staff of Members, however, have been denied such access and I have reaffirmed this policy. The only exception, which I am initiating at this time, is to grant selected key staff members serving in the offices of the Leadership

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of the Congress access since their principals receive sensitive intelligence on a regular basis and require staff assistance. This will include designated personal staff members from the staffs of your offices, the President Pro-Tempore of the Senate, and Majority and Minority Leaders of both the Senate and the House. My Legislative Counsel will be contacting your offices to determine which staff personnel you have designated for such access. I recently received a letter signed jointly by Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd and Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker submitting a request for staff access which will be honored and handled directly with their offices.

It is my firm belief that these procedures will not interfere with the proper flow of intelligence to the Congress, but will serve to enhance the protection of highly sensitive intelligence sources and methods by limiting access to an absolute need-to-know. I would welcome your support to facilitate acceptance of these procedures by committee chairmen in any way that you deem appropriate.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

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- 1 - ER
- 1 - D/OS
- 1 - Executive Secretary,
Security Committee
- 1 - OLC Subject
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